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In this paper I analyze the economic incentives that govern the strategic relationship
between the government and the independent media using a consistent analytical
framework. The analysis focuses on the extent to which the ‘free’ press can act as a
deterrent to corruption in governance. I find that although ‘press freedom’ is indeed
important as stressed in the existing literature, both mutually profitable cover-up
arrangements as well as the government’s ability to ‘manage’ the media’s allegations
tend to have a substantial negative impact on the media’s role as an effective watchdog.
Also, more competition in the media sector need not necessarily translate into increased
deterrence from corruption.
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If corruption is understood as an exchange of favors for money, then the
news media may be at least as exposed to corruption as is the
government bureaucracy… . Grzegorz W. Kolodko (2000)
Introduction
Existing scholarly opinion on the ability of the ‘free’ press to impart discipline to
corruptible governments is by no means unanimous. At one end of the spectrum, many
political scientists have expressed despair at the ephemeral nature of public uproar to
press-reports on misgovernance. To quote Pharr and Putnam (1997), “Despite the
maelstrom of media furor and public debate that frequently greets corruption and other
ethical lapses on the part of the officeholders, the public reaction is thought to be epi-
phenomenal…. in …much of the political science literature”. In contrast, economists
such as Besley and Burgess (2001), Stromberg (2001), and Stapenhurst (2000) are very
optimistic about the media’s ability to accurately report governmental misdeeds and
hence force governing politicians to be more responsive and accountable to the
electorate. What is clearly missing in the existing literature is a systematic framework
that would bring together the multitude of aspects involved in the strategic relationship
between the media and the government before taking stock of the media’s ability to
restrict corruption in governance. The purpose of this paper is to do just that.
If the above quotation from Kolodko (2000) (see page 166-7) is any reminder, the
media is not always altruistic as is assumed in much of the literature in this area. Often,
strong economic incentives (for example increase in circulation and advertising
revenues due to greater publicity) would seem to govern its decision to both collect and
release evidence of a misdeed in the public. Once we recognize this possibility, it would
seem that the transmission of information from the media to the pubic would not be
automatic. What about the possibility of the government and the media entering into a
mutually profitable arrangement (through side payments, granting exclusive licenses
providing access to political platforms such as a party ticket for forthcoming elections
and so on) to keep the evidence covered? What about the government’s ability to launch
its own counter-propaganda to question the media’s evidence? Also, can we always
trust a profit-minded media sector to refrain from raising false allegations? In the
ensuing analysis I address some of the above questions in order to gain a deeper
understanding on the media’s role as a watchdog.
Accordingly, the paper is organized as follows: The first section explores the incentives
for the government to indulge in corruption when the media can potentially find
‘compelling’ evidence. The next section explores the implications for deterrence when
the evidence collected need not be compelling but can be questioned in the public arena.
In the third section I extend the analysis by allowing the possibility of the media raising
false allegations. In the fourth section, I offer some preliminary insights on the effects of
recognizing multiple players in the media sector. In conclusion I find that although
‘press’ freedom is clearly important, both mutually profitable cover-ups as well as the
government’s ability to ‘spin’ the evidence projected by the media using smart
personalities would tend to take a lot of bite away from the media’s ability to deter
corrupt deals. Hence one needs to be guarded when evaluating the usefulness of
repeated exposures by the media of corrupt politicians: what we might be seeing is
simply the play of a ‘corrupt’ equilibrium.2
1 Model outline and implications for deterrence when evidence is ‘compelling’
I model the strategic relationship between the ruling government and the independent
media sector as a two-player game between them. As a first mover of the game, the
ruling government must choose between staying honest (which provides it with, say, a
benefit of H) or entering into a corrupt deal1 which could potentially provide an
additional benefit private benefit of H G a (where 0 > G a ) as long as no one is found
out. Let a decision to enter into a corrupt deal be represented by C and a decision to stay
honest represented by NC. The media makes the next move, where it must decide
whether to invest resources in exploring and possibly unearthing a potential corrupt deal
on the government’s part not knowing of its actual decision. So it effectively makes this
decision simultaneously with the government.
The media must incur an up-front cost F to investigate a scandal. The outcome of the
investigative process is stochastic. With a probability p ( 1 0 < <p ) the media manages
to find some evidence of the corrupt deal when the government enters into one. It has no
chance of finding anything if the government stays honest. In a later section, I relax this
assumption to allow for the possibility of false allegations on the media’s part.
Throughout the analysis, I assume p to be exogenous on the part of the government.
This assumption captures the notion of ‘press freedom’: There are effective
constitutional safeguards that prevent the ruling government from interfering with
media’s investigative efforts. Also the media does not have to worry about persecution
on the government’s part, should it signal a willingness to settle or release information
to the public. For the bulk of the analysis, I also assume p to be exogenous on the
media’s part for analytical simplicity. I relax this assumption later when I allow for
multiple players in the media sector.
In the event that the media finds some evidence, it stands to gain a payoff of H M a by
releasing it to the public if the latter perceives the evidence to be true. In this section, I
assume that the evidence if found by the media is always compelling: when released in
public, it proves the misdeeds of the government unquestionably. Hence the media is
assured a payoff of H M a should it release the evidence to the public. However, it
might be able to gain more by settling with the government and suppressing the
evidence. Hence when armed with some evidence, the media must decide between
signaling a willingness to settle (S) or releasing it (NS). Similarly, the government must
decide between reciprocating to media’s willingness to settle or rejecting it. To keep the
analysis simple, I shall assume that both sides anticipate the outcome of the settlement
to be given by a Nash Bargaining Solution.2 Also H and M G , ,a a is common
1 A corrupt deal involves a decision taken by the government authority, which imposes a social loss.
This could take many forms including procuring poor quality material & needlessly expensive
provision among other things. Some examples of corruption scandals in India include the Bofors
howitzer scandal (1986) and the very recent Defensegate Scandal (2001). The main issue in both the
scandals involves acceptance of bribes by government officials towards defense procurement.
2 As pointed out by a referee, given that the legal machinery does not enforce such a settlement, what
imparts credibility to such a deal is not clear-cut and is in itself an interesting question. However,
parallel institutions such as the Mafia do exist and provide at least a semblance of protection. I have
used the Nash Bargaining Solution simply as a pedagogical device to study the implications of a
media-government nexus for corruption deterrence.3
knowledge to both the players, who are assumed to be risk-neutral. See Figure 1 for a
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Before proceeding with the analysis, let me define the strategies of the two players
concerned. A strategy for the government G S would specify the government’s choice
between going corrupt and staying honest (C or NC) and then choosing whether to show
willingness to settle or not (S or NS) following the media’s willingness to settle (S).
Hence } , { } , { NS S NC C SG ´ Î . Similarly, the media would first decide whether to
investigate or not (I or NI). Further it would also have to decide whether to signal a
willingness to settle or release evidence right away should it find some evidence (S or
NS). Hence, the media’s strategy would be given by } , { } , { NS S NI I SM ´ Î . I restrict
my attention to pure strategies.
1.1 Compelling evidence and corruption deterrence
To understand the impact of a watchful media towards deterring corrupt deals, I
examine Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SGPNE) of the above game using backward
induction. I begin with the government’s choice of whether to reciprocate the media’s
willingness to settle (S). The government would anticipate that its refusal to settle would
instigate the media to make the compelling evidence public. In that event it would no
longer be able to either extract the gains from a corrupt deal or retain an honest image.
Hence its payoff would fall to zero .3 Anticipating a Nash Bargaining outcome, its
payoff from settling would be } ) 1 {( 2 / 1 H H M G a a - + * (The media’s outside option in
this case is H M a ). Hence the government would decide to settle if:
0 } ) 1 {( 2 / 1 > - + * H H M G a a …(1) i.e. if M G a a > + ) 1 (.
Assuming that the above condition holds, let us now examine the media’s choice
between showing willingness to settle (S) and making the evidence public right away
(NS).
The media would rationally anticipate a favorable response from the government to a
settlement offer, and hence a decision to settle (S) on its part would provide it a payoff
of H H H H M G M G M ) 1 ( 2 / 1 } ) 1 {( 2 / 1 a a a a a + + * = - + * + . It would hope to get
H M a if it were to release the evidence right away (NS). Clearly as long as
M G a a > + ) 1 ( , the media would be better off showing a willingness to settle at this
decision node.
Hence, when deciding whether to investigate (I)o rn o t( NI), the media would expect a
settlement if it were to get the evidence. Hence if the government were to enter into a
corrupt deal (C), the media’s expected payoff from a decision to investigate (I)i sg i v e n
by F H M G - + + * * } ) 1 ( 2 / 1 { a a p . Its payoff from not investigating is 0. Hence the
media’s best response would be to investigate (I), if 0 } ) 1 ( 2 / 1 { > - + + * * F H M G a a p .
3 Note that the assumption of press freedom is important here. The government does not have the option
of threatening the media to suppress the evidence. It is also important to note the implicit assumption
of zero corruption tolerance on the part of the society. A government that is proved corrupt in the
public arena has no chances of surviving. Although this is probably a strong assumption, relaxing it
would only weaken the impact of media on corruption deterrence.5
What would be the media’s best response if the government were to stay honest (H)?
Since by assumption the media cannot find any evidence when the government stays
honest (p =0 ) , 4 its payoff from investigating would be – F. Hence the media is clearly
better off not investigating (NI). Notice that for F=0, the media is never worse off by
investigating for any p .5 In this case, investigation is a weakly dominant move for the
media, irrespective of the government’s decision.
Suppose that F = 0. Then the critical question is whether the government would want to
enter into a corrupt deal (C) knowing fully that the media would investigate its action
(i.e. Can (C) ever be a best response to (I)?)? The government’s payoff from going
corrupt (C) in this case is given by H H M G G ) 1 ( 2 / ) 1 ( ) 1 ( a a p a p - + * + + * - . The first
component in the above expression captures the payoff that would result if the media’s
investigation were fruitless: the government would be able to get away with an honest
image and also obtain the benefits from the corrupt deal. This occurs with a probability
of p - 1 . However, in the event that the media manages to get the evidence, the
government would have to settle and get a payoff of H M G ) 1 {( 2 / 1 a a - + * .T h i si s
captured in the second component of the expression. The government would be assured
of a payoff of H if it were to refrain from the corrupt deal (NC).6
The government would choose to enter into a corrupt deal (C)i f
H H M G G ) 1 ( 2 / ) 1 ( ) 1 ( a a p a p - + * + + * - > H
.The above condition simplifies to ) 2 / 1 /( ) 2 / 1 ( ) 1 ( p a p a - * + > + M G . An important
implication of the above condition is that the government might choose to enter into a
corrupt deal (C)e v e ni f 1 = p . In fact this is the case when 1 + > M G a a . Hence when
the gains from a corrupt deal are large enough, the ability to settle with the media would
imply that the government would prefer to engage in corruption (C), even when it
perfectly anticipates that the media would investigate and find concrete and
unambiguous evidence against it. This result is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1: When settlement is mutually profitable, i.e. M G a a > + ) 1 ( , even if
0 = F and 1 = p , (so that a potential scandal would be investigated and compelling
evidence found with certainty), )] , ( ), , ( [ S I S S C S M G = = is a Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium (SGPNE) of the above game when 1 + > M G a a .W h e n 1 < p , the above
strategy profile emerges as a SGPNE, whenever,
) 2 / 1 /( ) 1 ( 2 / p a p a - + * > M G .
4 This would no longer be true once we allowed for the possibility of false allegations.
5 This is also due to the assumption of press freedom. Effective safeguards from government coercion
imply that the press could never be worse-off from having some evidence as compared to not having any.
6 Again this is primarily due to the assumption in this section that the media cannot raise false
allegations.6
It is also interesting to note that the expected payoff from entering into a corrupt deal
(C) increases as p falls. In fact when p =0 ,( C) would strictly dominate (H). Hence the
government has a clear incentive to interfere with the media’s investigative effort if
possible. Its inability to affect p is critical for the media to have any deterrent effect on
corruption. In this sense, press freedom matters. However, it may not be enough.
What about the case when settlement is not mutually profitable i.e. M G a a £ + ) 1 (? I n
this case, if the government were to choose (C) then the media’s expected payoff from
(I) would be F H M - pa . Hence the media’s best response would be (I)i f
0 > - F H M pa . As before, if the government were to choose to (NC), the media’s best
response would be (NI). Again suppose that F = 0 so that the media would never be
worse off by (I) for any level of p .
In the absence of settlement possibilities, if the media plays (I), the government’s
expected payoff from (C)i s H G) 1 ( ) 1 ( a p + * - . Notice that contrary to the earlier case,
the second component disappears, as a settlement is no longer possible. As before (NC)
fetches an assured payoff of H. Hence (C) would be a best response to (I) if
H G) 1 ( ) 1 ( a p + * - > H i.e. if ) 1 /( 1 ) 1 ( p a - > + G . Hence in this case, the media’s
ability to deter a corrupt deal crucially depends on p .I f 1 = p so that the media can
come up with compelling evidence for sure, then the corrupt deal is completely
deterred. However, when 1 < p , for any given p there exists an G a such that the
government would proceed with the corrupt deal. This result is summarized in the
proposition below:
Proposition 2: Assume that F = 0 and M G a a £ + ) 1 ( (so that settlement is not mutually
profitable). For any p such that 1 0 < £p , }] , { }, , { [ NS I S NS C S M G = = emerges as a
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SGPNE), so long as ) 1 /( p p a - > G . Hence even
when the media’s private gain from exposing the government is large enough to
preclude a settlement, the government’s potential gain from the corrupt deal could still
lead it towards dishonesty. For fairly large gains on the government’s side, even a large
probability of detection may not be enough to deter corrupt deals.
2 Impact on deterrence when evidence is ‘contestable’
An important assumption in the analysis so far has been the media’s ability to uncover
compelling evidence. However, in many real-life situations the members of the ruling
government can challenge allegations made by the media. Allegations of corruption
often act as ‘curtain-raisers’ to lengthy debates in the public arena (e.g. as recently in
India following the exposure of corruption in defense dealings by a news web-site
‘Tehelka.com’). The ruling governments use every opportunity to counter the charges
raised and come up with their own justifications for their alleged misdeeds employing
media-savvy spokespersons. In such a situation, following its release of evidence, the
media must brace itself to compete with the government in a contest to retain the public
opinion in its favor. Its gain from releasing evidence against a fraudulent deal is no
longer assured. At the same time all would not be lost for the government if the media
went public with the charges: it would have a fighting chance to defend its actions. Hen
in contrast to the game in the previous section, the payoffs to the two parties following7
the media’s release of evidence are now different. This would also influence their
payoffs from a successful settlement as their bargaining position changes. The
government’s position improves at the expense of the media. I examine the
consequences of such a contest for corruption deterrence. However to keep things
simple, I abstract from the possibility of settlement. Hence one could consider the media
in this section to be ‘idealistic’: it refrains from colluding with the government. Figure 2





IN I I N I
F H - , 0 , H 0 , ) 1 ( H G a +
FN F
p p - 1

















As before, I work my way through the game backwards. Hence I begin with the contest
phase of the game which gets initiated should the media investigate and find evidence
against the government (remember that settlement has been ruled out by assumption).
The expected payoffs to the media and the government in this stage can be expressed as
follows:
Media: m c H g m m M * - * + a )} /( {… ( 2 )
Government: g c H g m g G * - + * + ) 1 ( )} /( { a …(3)
In expression (2), m and g represent the media and governments’ expenses respectively
towards capturing the public opinion in their favor. These would include among other
things, the time spent in preparing for and making public appearances, money spent in
advertising campaigns and so on. The expression )} /( { g m m + represents the probability
of the media winning the contest. It is modeled as a function of the relative expenditures
made by the two sides.7 Accordingly, the probability of the government winning this
contest is simply )} /( { )} /( { 1 g m g g m m + = + - .8 The term c measures the marginal
cost of such expenditures. I have assumed the same marginal cost for both the players
to focus on the differing gains to the two sides for deterrence. The terms H M a and
H G) 1 ( a + measures the gross gains to the two sides respectively from winning the
contest. Both sides choose m and g simultaneously. To identify the interior Nash
Equilibrium of this contest, I look at the following optimization problems:
Media: ] )} /( [{ m c H g m m Max M m * - * + a
Government: ] ) 1 ( )} /( [{ g c H g m g Max G g * - + * + a
The first order conditions of the above maximization exercises are given by:
0 ) ]( ) /( [
2 * * * = - + c H m g g M a …(4) (Media)
0 } ) 1 ]{( ) /( [
2 * * * = - + + c H m g m G a …(5) (Government)
Solving the above pair of equation yields:
c H g M G G M
2 2 * ) 1 /( ) 1 ( a a a a + + + = .
Notice that
* g decreases with c and increases with G a as intuition would suggest.
c H m M G G M
2 2 * ) 1 /( ) 1 ( a a a a + + + = .
7 Such Contest Success functions have been recently used in the economics and political science
literature to model situations of conflict (for example Skaperdas (1992)) and incompletely defined
property rights (Robson and Skaperdas (2000)). They have been used to model the outcomes of court-
room deliberations as in Hirshleifer and Osborne (1999).
8 I have assumed this functional form for analytical simplicity. It seems to me that the results would
hold even for a more general contest technology. However, I have not worked them out as yet.9
Similarly
* m decreases with c and increases with M a as intuition would suggest.
Accordingly, the expected payoffs to the government and media from the contest phase
are given by:
2 3 * ) 1 /( ) 1 ( M G G H G a a a + + + =
2 3 * ) 1 /( ) ( M G M H M a a a + + =
As with the previous section, the media would choose to investigate if
0 ) 1 /( ) (
2 3 > - + + * F H M G M a a a p .
Again if F = 0, then the media will always prefer to investigate so long as 0 ³ p .
Assuming this, the government’s payoff from staying honest is H. However, its
expected payoff from entering into a corrupt deal is given by:
2 3 ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( M G G G H H a a a p a p + + + * + + * - .
Hence the government prefers to enter into a corrupt deal if
H H H M G G G > + + + * + + * -
2 3 ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( a a a p a p …(6)
Eliminating H, the above expression reduces to,
1 ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 3 > + + + * + + * - M G G G a a a p a p
Notice that for given p a and M , the expression on the left-hand side is increasing in G a .
Hence for large enough values of G a , the above condition would hold and the
government would prefer to go corrupt. Also notice that in line with the results of the
previous section, returns from corruption are decreasing in p . However there are some
important differences. Previously, when settlement was infeasible, the government
would be induced to enter into a corrupt deal if ) 1 /( p p a - > G . In contrast to this, when
evidence is contestable, equation (6) implies that the critical value of G a , for any given
p , is strictly lower than the above threshold and approaches it only as M a goes to
infinity. This result is depicted in Figure 4. Further, even when 1 = p and settlement is
ruled out, the government might still choose to enter into a corrupt deal. Hence, when
the government can challenge the evidence projected by the media in the public arena,
the certain prospect of facing media allegations is not necessarily enough to rule out
corruption. For 1 = p , the above inequality reduces to 1 ) 1 /( ) 1 (
2 3 > + + + M G G a a a .
This result is summarized in the proposition below:
Proposition 3: Assume F =0 ,a n d 1 = p so that the media investigates the scandal for
sure and comes up with some evidence. However, collected evidence is contestable and
settlement possibilities are ruled out (what I refer to as the assumption of an idealistic
press). For any given M a ,l e t
C
G a be the critical value of G a such that
1 ) 1 /( ) 1 (
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as a SGPNE of the above game.10
The results of this section suggest that when the government can ‘play’ with the media’s
allegations, it is less deterred by the latter’s ability to find evidence against it (p ).
Hence it is no wonder that in countries where the rule of the law prevails to protect
press freedom, one finds political parties investing in their ability to play with it by
employing media-savvy personalities.
3 Effects of pernicious media
Throughout the analysis so far, the government would have to face the possibility of
media allegations only if it were to undertake a corrupt deal. In this section I relax this
assumption to explore the possibility of the media being able to raise false allegations
(for example due to a buyout by the opposition or an interest group) and its consequence
for deterrence. Although, in a real-life situation, the media’s incentive to raise false
allegations would be tempered by anti-defamation law (if they exist) and also by the
fear of losing credibility if proved wrong, I abstract from these complications to isolate
the deterrent effect of false allegations. Hence in what follows, the media has nothing to
fear by charging the government and therefore would do so regardless of the
government’s action. (One could think of this as an extreme form of press freedom.9)
As a result, the government would anticipate a contest with the media even if it were to
stay honest. The exact sequence of moves in this game is depicted in Figure 3.
As usual, I proceed to solve the game backwards, beginning with the sub-game
involving a contest between the media and the government following the latter’s
decision to stay honest. Characterizing the Nash Equilibrium for this sub-game involves
focussing on the following optimization problems:
Government: ] )} /( [{ g c H g m g Maxg * - * +
Media: ] )} /( [{ m c H g m m Max M m * - * + a
The first order conditions of the above maximization exercises are given by:
0 ) ]( ) /( [
2 * * * = - + c H m g g M a …(7) (Media)
0 ) ]( ) /( [
2 * * * = - + c H m g m …(8) (Government)
Solving the above pair of equation yields:
c H g M M
2 * ) 1 /( a a + = .
c H m M M
2 2 * ) 1 /( a a + = .
Accordingly, the government’s expected payoff from staying honest would be:
2 * ) 1 /( M H H G a + =
































Similarly, the media’s expected payoff from raising false allegations would be:
2 3 * ) 1 /( ) ( M M H H M a a + = .
Borrowing from the results of the previous section, the expected payoffs to the
government and the media respectively when the former decides to enter into a corrupt
deal are given by:
2 3 * ) 1 /( ) 1 ( M G G H G a a a + + + =
2 3 * ) 1 /( ) ( M G M H M a a a + + =
Hence the government would go for a corrupt deal if its expected payoff from doing so
(
* G ) exceeded that from staying honest (
*
H G ). Notice that
* *
H G G = when 0 = G a .
Further 0 ) 1 /( ) 3 1 ( ) 1 ( /
3 2 * > + + + + + = ¶ ¶ M G M G G G H G a a a a a a for 0 ³ G a .
Hence
* *
H G G > , whenever 0 > G a . This implies that the media’s ability to raise false
allegations would eliminate its capacity to deter corrupt deals. The government would
prefer competing for a larger gain rather than a smaller one.12
Proposition 4: When the media can raise false allegations so that gains from honest
governance are not assured, it might not be able to generate any deterrence from
corruption.10
4 Some conjectures on effects of media competition
Can a more competitive media sector provide greater deterrence from corruption? To
examine this question I introduce two independent players in the media sector. To focus
purely on the effects of competition, I assume that the evidence once collected is always
compelling. The time-line of this expanded game is as follows: as before, the
government makes the first move and has to decide whether to enter into a corrupt deal
keeping in mind a possible threat of exposure from the two media players. Next, each of
the two media players must decide whether to proceed with investigating a potential
scandal (F > 0). Each player ( 2 , 1 = i ) must also decide on the amount of effort ( i e )h e
devotes towards the investigation to compete with the rival in trying to get to the
evidence first. In the subsequent analysis, I refer to the winner of this competition as the
“first player”. I call the loser of this competition the “second player”. For simplicity, I
assume that 1 = p . Hence one of the two players are certain to get the evidence. Who
gets to it first depends on the relative effort exerted by them towards the investigation.
Hence let ) /( 2 1 1 e e e + represent the probability of player 1 getting the evidence first.
Accordingly ) /( 2 1 2 e e e + (= )} /( { 1 2 1 1 e e e + - ) gives the probability of player 2 being
the first player. However, the second player might get to the evidence later. Let q (0 < q
< 1) be the probability of the second player getting the evidence later. However, getting
the evidence later would be useful only if the first player would settle with the
government and not release it in public.
Having got the evidence, the first player who must choose between releasing it in the
public right away and get ( H M a ) for sure (remember that the evidence is compelling)
or offering to settle with the government. Similarly, the government must decide
between settling or not. As before, both sides anticipate the payoffs of the settlement to
be given by a Nash Bargaining Solution. However, contrary to the earlier model, the
government’s decision to settle with the first player is trickier in this case. On the one
hand, a settlement with the first player (involving paying him a side transfer) would
keep the option of earning the rents from the corrupt deal alive. However, on the other
hand, the government would also have to take into account the potential threat of
exposure from the second player. This would reduce the expected gains from the
settlement with the first player and hence weaken the possibility of a settlement.
I examine the settlement game more carefully next.
To understand the how the threat of an exposure by the second player works its way into
government’s decision to settle with the first player, I begin my analysis backwards.
Suppose that having settled with the first player, the government now faces a threat of
10 Apart from the caveats noted earlier, the starkness of this result is also due to the assumption that the
government faces the same probability of winning irrespective of its action. It would be interesting to
explore the sensitivity of this result by envisaging a contest tilted in favor of the side with the truth
along the lines of Hirshleifer and Osborne (1999).13
exposure from the second player, who offers to settle. Clearly at this stage, the terms of
trade of the first settlement are irrelevant for the government. The bribe paid to the first
media player ( 1 b ) is a sunk cost. Hence, it faces exactly the same decision problem as in
the previous model. Accordingly, both the parties prefer to settle at this stage if
M G a a > + ) 1 ( . Assuming this condition holds, their payoffs are:
Government: 1
2 } ) 1 {( 2 / 1 b H V M G G - - + * = a a
Second Player: H V M G M ) 1 ( 2 / 1
2 a a + + * =
The superscript 2 denotes settlement payoffs with the second player). Accordingly, the
government’s expected payoff from any side-payment ( 1 b ) in the first stage would be
given by 1 } ) 1 {( 2 / ) 1 ( ) 1 ( b H q q M G G - - + * + + * - a a a . Following the payment of 1 b ,
with a probability of (1 - q), the second player would not have any evidence and the
government would be able to retain the gains from corruption. However, with a
probability of q, the second player would get the evidence, and the government’s best
option would be to settle with him. From this expression it is clear that 1 b would never
exceed }. ) 1 {( 2 / ) 1 ( ) 1 ( H q q M G G a a a - + * + + * - (The government always has the
option of not settling and getting a payoff of 0.) Accordingly, the Nash Bargaining
outcome of the first stage settlement would imply the following payoffs to the two
sides:
Government: ] } ) 1 {( 2 / ) 1 ( ) 1 [( 2 / 1 :
1 H H q q V M M G G G a a a a - - + * + + * - *
First Media Player:
] } ) 1 {( 2 / ) 1 ( ) 1 [( 2 / 1 :
1 H H q q H V M M G G M M a a a a a - - + * + + * - * +
Hence the settlement would be mutually profitable for both the parties only if
0 ] } ) 1 {( 2 / ) 1 ( ) 1 [( 2 / 1 > - - + * + + * - * H H q q M M G G a a a a . This condition reduces to
M G q q a a * - + ³ + ) 2 / 1 /( ) 2 / 1 ( ) 1 ( . Notice that since 1 ) 2 / 1 /( ) 2 / 1 ( > - + q q , the range
of values of G a for which settlement is feasible for a given M a in the first stage gets
reduced in comparison to the one player case. For example, when q=0 , the above
condition reduces to exactly the one in our basic model: M G a a ³ + ) 1 (. A t t h e o t h e r
extreme, when q=1, the above condition resolves itself to M G a a 3 ) 1 ( ³ + .H e n c e ,i n
general settlement possibilities are reduced. Also notice that when settlement is
infeasible in the first stage, then second stage becomes irrelevant, as the first player
would release the evidence in the public right away. For the range of G a such that
settlement is not feasible, the government would prefer to stay honest given the
compelling nature of evidence and the certainty of someone finding it. These results are
summarized in the proposition below:
Proposition 5: When one allows for competition in the media sector, for any given M a ,
the minimum G a such that settlement is mutually feasible in the first stage increases as
long as both the media players would find it profitable to investigate in a potential14
scandal. In other words, settlement possibilities reduce. Over this range the government
would prefer to abstain from corruption.
It is also interesting to note that for 1 0 < <p the results in proposition 2 are still
applicable in this two-player model as long as settlement is infeasible.
As before, when settlement is feasible in the first stage, the government would go for a
corrupt deal only if its expected payoff from doing so exceeded that from staying
honest. This is represented by the following condition:
H H H q q M M G G > - - + * + + * - * ] } ) 1 {( 2 / ) 1 ( ) 1 [( 2 / 1 a a a a .
This condition simplifies itself into M G q q q a a * - + + - > + ) 2 / 1 /( ) 2 / 1 ( ) 2 / 1 /( 2 ) 1 (. I n
contrast, the corresponding condition for the single-player model (as given in
proposition 1) is M G a a + > + 2 1. L e t
*
G a represent the re-initialized value of G a over
the region where settlement is feasible in both the cases. (Hence for the current model,
0 , ) 2 / 1 /( ) 2 / 1 (
* * ³ * - + - = G M G G q q a a a a while for the single-player model,
0 ,
* * ³ - = G M G G a a a a .) In terms of
*
G a , the government would go for a corrupt deal in
the two-player case anticipating a settlement with the media if ) 2 / 1 /( 2 ) 1 (
* q G - > +a .
For the single player model, it would do so when 2 ) 1 (
* > + G a . Comparing the above
conditions, it is clear that the minimum value of
*
G a for which the government would
enter into a corrupt deal is higher in the two-player case than the one-player case for any
q ( 1 0 £ < q ). Hence the government is relatively more deterred in the two-player case.
This result is summarized in the proposition below:
Proposition 6: Even when settlement is feasible, the government is relatively more
deterred from entering into a corrupt deal in the two player case so long as it anticipates
a credible threat of investigation from both the players. The possibility of having to
settle again dampens the gains from corruption.
Although the above results imply that competition in the media sector would have a
favorable impact towards corruption deterrence, it is also important to keep in mind the
caveat spelt out in both the above propositions. We would have increased deterrence
only as long as both the media players found it profitable to investigate. If the
government refused to settle with the first player, the payoff from investigating a
scandal would only be derived by making it public. Also, this payoff would only accrue
to the first player. Hence while deciding whether to investigate or not, both the players
would have to keep in mind the expected payoffs from the run-off for getting the
evidence first. Should both players decide to investigate, their decision problems would
be given by:
Player 1: F e H e e e M e - - * + 1 2 1 1 )} /( { max
1 a
Player 2: F e H e e e M e - - * + 2 2 1 2 )} /( { max
2 a
Assuming an interior Nash Equilibrium, the first-order conditions for the above
maximization problem are:15
0 1 } ) /( {
2
2 1 2 = - * + H e e e M a …(9)
0 1 } ) /( {
2
2 1 1 = - * + H e e e M a …(10)
Solving (9) and (10) simultaneously, we get the following:




1 H e e M a * = = …(11)
Accordingly, the equilibrium payoff for either player is F H M - *a ) 4 / 1 (. L e t H=1.
Clearly, as long as 0 ) 4 / 1 ( > - * F M a (i.e. F M 4 > a ) for both the players, investigation
is a strictly dominant move and both of them would investigate. However, if F M 4 < a ,
then both the players would be strictly worse off (relative to their initial payoffs of zero)
if they investigated simultaneously. In this case the structure of payoffs is best
represented by the following normal-form game:
In the above matrix, 0 ) 4 / 1 ( < - * F M a , while 0 > - F M a . The first expression in a
cell gives the payoff to player one and the next the payoff to player two. From the above
matrix it is clear that the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium would comprise of one player
playing (I) and the other playing (NI). Hence despite having two players to begin with,
effectively only one of them would prefer to investigate in equilibrium. This result is
summarized in the proposition below:
Proposition 7: Only when F M 4 > a , would both players investigate even if they did
not anticipate settling with the government later. Hence the benefit of increased
deterrence as outlined in proposition 5 would only be realized over this range. For
F F M 4 < <a , the threat of both the players investigating in the absence of settlement
opportunities would not be credible and proposition 5 would not hold.
On the contrary, when the government is willing to settle, the potential gain from an
investigation would be larger (particularly because even the first-round loser could hope
to get the evidence later and gain from it). This would in turn lower the threshold that
M a must cross for both the players to investigate. Hence the threat of both the players
investigating would be more credible when the government would find it profitable to
cover up the findings. To sum-up, the deterrent effect of an increase in the number of
players in the media sector seems ambiguous. More players lead to greater deterrence
only when all of them choose to effectively participate in the investigative process
regardless of settlement possibilities. For this to happen, the gain from public exposure
must be sufficiently large.
Investigate (I) Not Investigate (NI)
Investigate (I) F F M M - * - * a a ) 4 / 1 ( , ) 4 / 1 ( 0 , F M - a




) 1 /( p p -
M a
5 Conclusions
In the foregoing analysis, I have attempted to analyze the extent to which ‘free’ press
can act as a watchdog on the government. The results of my analysis suggest that the
media’s role in deterring corruption might be more limited than is generally thought.
Even the media’s credible threat of investigating corruption with certainty and having a
good chance of finding compelling evidence might not be enough to deter the
government from doing so. When the media is prone to raising false allegations, it may
not be able to provide any deterrence from corruption. However, this is not to say that
‘press freedom’ does not matter at all. The government’s inability to affect p is critical
for the media to provide any credible deterrence. When one explicitly allows for
multiple players in the media sector, its effect on deterrence turns out to be ambiguous:
Although competition in the media sector tends to increase deterrence by making a
settlement more difficult, for it to be effective, the gain from public exposure must be
sufficiently large.17
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